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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 94-23
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CITY OF EDMONDS, PETITIONER v. OXFORD
HOUSE, INC., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[May 15, 1995]

  Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The Fair Housing Act (FHA or Act) prohibits discrimi-
nation in housing against, inter alios, persons with
handicaps.  Section 3607(b)(1) of the Act entirely ex-
empts from the FHA's compass -any reasonable local,
State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.-
42 U. S. C. 3607(b)(1).  This case presents the question
whether a provision in petitioner City of Edmonds' zon-
ing code qualifies for 3607(b)(1)'s complete exemption
from FHA scrutiny.  The provision, governing areas
zoned for single-family dwelling units, defines -family-
as -persons [without regard to number] related by ge-
netics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer
[unrelated] persons.-  Edmonds Community Development
Code (ECDC) 21.30.010 (1991).

  The defining provision at issue describes who may
compose a family unit; it does not prescribe -the maxi-
mum number of occupants- a dwelling unit may house.
We hold that 3607(b)(1) does not exempt prescriptions
of the family-defining kind, i.e., provisions designed to
foster the family character of a neighborhood.  Instead,
3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption removes from the FHA's
scope only total occupancy limits, i.e.,  numerical ceilings
that serve to prevent overcrowding in living quarters.

                            I
  In the summer of 1990, respondent Oxford House
opened a group home in the City of Edmonds, Washing-
ton for 10 to 12 adults recovering from alcoholism and
drug addiction.  The group home, called Oxford House-
Edmonds, is located in a neighborhood zoned for single-
family residences.  Upon learning that Oxford House had
leased and was operating a home in Edmonds, the City
issued criminal citations to the owner and a resident of
the house.  The citations charged violation of the zoning
code rule that defines who may live in single-family
dwelling units.  The occupants of such units must
compose a -family,- and family, under the City's defining
rule, -means an individual or two or more persons
related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of
five or fewer persons who are not related by genetics,
adoption, or marriage.-  Edmonds Community Develop-
ment Code (ECDC) 21.30.010.  Oxford House-Edmonds
houses more than five unrelated persons, and therefore
does not conform to the code.
  Oxford House asserted reliance on the Fair Housing
Act, 102 Stat. 1619, 42 U. S. C. 3601 et seq., which de-
clares it unlawful -[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental,
or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any buyer or renter because of a handicap of . . . that
buyer or a renter.-  3604(f)(1)(A).  The parties have
stipulated, for purposes of this litigation, that the resi-
dents of Oxford House-Edmonds -are recovering alcohol-
ics and drug addicts and are handicapped persons within
the meaning- of the Act.  App. 106.
  Discrimination covered by the FHA includes -a refusal
to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford [handicapped] person[s] equal oppor-
tunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.-  3604(f)(3)(B).  Ox-
ford House asked Edmonds to make a -reasonable ac-
commodation- by allowing it to remain in the single-
family dwelling it had leased.  Group homes for recover-
ing substance abusers, Oxford urged, need 8 to 12 resi-
dents to be financially and therapeutically viable.  Ed-
monds declined to permit Oxford House to stay in a
single-family residential zone, but passed an ordinance
listing group homes as permitted uses in multifamily
and general commercial zones.
  Edmonds sued Oxford House in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington
seeking a declaration that the FHA does not constrain
the City's zoning code family definition rule.  Oxford
House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging the City
with failure to make a -reasonable accommodation-
permitting maintenance of the group home in a single-
family zone.  The United States filed a separate action
on the same FHA--reasonable accommodation- ground,
and the two cases were consolidated.  Edmonds sus-
pended its criminal enforcement actions pending resolu-
tion of the federal litigation.
  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District
Court held that ECDC 21.30.010, defining -family,- is
exempt from the FHA under 3607(b)(1) as a -reasonable
. . . restrictio[n] regarding the maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.-  App. to Pet.
for Cert. B-7.  The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed; holding 3607(b)(1)'s absolute
exemption inapplicable, the Court of Appeals remanded
the cases for further consideration of the claims asserted
by Oxford House and the United States.  Edmonds v.
Washington State Building Code Council, 18 F. 3d 802
(1994).
  The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with an Eleventh
Circuit decision declaring exempt under 3607(b)(1) a
family definition provision similar to the Edmonds pre-
scription.  See Elliott v. Athens, 960 F. 2d 975 (1992).
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 513 U. S.
___ (1994), and we now affirm the Ninth Circuit's
judgment.

                           II
  The sole question before the Court is whether Ed-
monds' family composition rule qualifies as a -restric-
tio[n] regarding the maximum number of occupants per-
mitted to occupy a dwelling- within the meaning of the
FHA's absolute exemption.  42 U. S. C. 3607(b)(1).  In
answering this question, we are mindful of the Act's
stated policy -to provide, within constitutional limita-
tions, for fair housing throughout the United States.-
3601.  We also note precedent recognizing the FHA's
-broad and inclusive- compass, and therefore according
a -generous construction- to the Act's complaint-filing
provision.  Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U. S. 205, 209, 212 (1972).  Accordingly, we regard this
case as an instance in which an exception to -a general
statement of policy- is sensibly read -narrowly in order
to preserve the primary operation of the [policy].-  Com-
missioner v. Clark, 489 U. S. 726, 739 (1989).

                            A
  Congress enacted 3607(b)(1) against the backdrop of
an evident distinction between municipal land use
restrictions and maximum occupancy restrictions.
  Land use restrictions designate -districts in which only
compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are
excluded.-  D. Mandelker, Land Use Law 4.16, pp. 113-
114 (3d ed. 1993) (hereinafter Mandelker).  These re-
strictions typically categorize uses as single-family resi-
dential, multiple-family residential, commercial, or indus-
trial.  See, e.g., 1 E. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of
Zoning and Planning 8.01, pp. 8-2 to 8-3 (4th ed.
1995); Mandelker 1.03, p. 4; 1 E. Yokley, Zoning Law
and Practice 7-2, p. 252 (4th ed. 1978).
  Land use restrictions aim to prevent problems caused
by the -pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.-
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365,
388 (1926).  In particular, reserving land for single-
family residences preserves the character of neighbor-
hoods, securing -zones where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people.-  Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 9 (1974); see also Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 521 (1977)
(Burger, C. J., dissenting) (purpose of East Cleveland's
single-family zoning ordinance -is the traditional one of
preserving certain areas as family residential communi-
ties-).  To limit land use to single-family residences, a
municipality must define the term -family-; thus family
composition rules are an essential component of single-
family residential use restrictions.
  Maximum occupancy restrictions, in contradistinction,
cap the number of occupants per dwelling, typically in
relation to available floor space or the number and type
of rooms.  See, e.g., Uniform Housing Code 503(b)
(1988); BOCA National Property Maintenance Code
PM-405.3, PM-405.5 (1993) (hereinafter BOCA Code);
Standard Housing Code 306.1, 306.2 (1991); APHA-
CDC Recommended Minimum Housing Standards 9.02,
p. 37 (1986) (hereinafter APHA-CDC Standards).  These
restrictions ordinarily apply uniformly to all residents of
all dwelling units.  Their purpose is to protect health
and safety by preventing dwelling overcrowding.  See,
e.g., BOCA Code PM-101.3, PM-405.3, PM-405.5 and
commentary; Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and
Tenant Remedies, 56 B. U. L. Rev. 1, 41-45 (1976).
  We recognized this distinction between maximum
occupancy restrictions and land use restrictions in Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977).  In
Moore, the Court held unconstitutional the constricted
definition of -family- contained in East Cleveland's
housing ordinance.  East Cleveland's ordinance -se-
lect[ed] certain categories of relatives who may live
together and declare[d] that others may not-; in particu-
lar, East Cleveland's definition of -family- made -a crime
of a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson.-
Id., at 498-499 (plurality opinion).  In response to East
Cleveland's argument that its aim was to prevent
overcrowded dwellings, streets, and schools, we observed
that the municipality's restrictive definition of family
served the asserted, and undeniably legitimate, goals
-marginally, at best.-  Id., at 500 (footnote omitted).
Another East Cleveland ordinance, we noted, -specifically
addressed . . . the problem of overcrowding-; that ordi-
nance tied -the maximum permissible occupancy of a
dwelling to the habitable floor area.-  Id., at 500, n. 7;
accord, id., at 520, n. 16 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment).  Justice Stewart, in dissent, also distin-
guished restrictions designed to -preserv[e] the character
of a residential area,- from prescription of -a minimum
habitable floor area per person,- id., at 539, n. 9, in the
interest of community health and safety.
  Section 3607(b)(1)'s language--restrictions regarding
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy
a dwelling--surely encompasses maximum occupancy
restrictions.  But the formulation does not fit family
composition rules typically tied to land use restrictions.
In sum, rules that cap the total number of occupants in
order to prevent overcrowding of a dwelling -plainly and
unmistakably,- see A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324
U. S. 490, 493 (1945), fall within 3607(b)(1)'s absolute
exemption from the FHA's governance; rules designed to
preserve the family character of a neighborhood, fasten-
ing on the composition of households rather than on the
total number of occupants living quarters can contain, do
not.

                            B
  Turning specifically to the City's Community Develop-
ment Code, we note that the provisions Edmonds
invoked against Oxford House, ECDC 16.20.010 and
21.30.010, are classic examples of a use restriction and
complementing family composition rule.  These provi-
sions do not cap the number of people who may live in
a dwelling.  In plain terms, they direct that dwellings be
used only to house families.  Captioned -USES,- ECDC
16.20.010 provides that the sole -Permitted Primary
Us[e]- in a single-family residential zone is -[s]ingle-
family dwelling units.-  Edmonds itself recognizes that
this provision simply -defines those uses permitted in a
single family residential zone.-  Pet. for Cert. 3.
  A separate provision caps the number of occupants a
dwelling may house, based on floor area:
-Floor Area.  Every dwelling unit shall have at least
one room which shall have not less than 120 square
feet of floor area.  Other habitable rooms, except
kitchens, shall have an area of not less than 70
square feet.  Where more than two persons occupy
a room used for sleeping purposes, the required floor
area shall be increased at the rate of 50 square feet
for each occupant in excess of two.-  ECDC
19.10.000 (adopting Uniform Housing Code 503(b)
(1988)).
This space and occupancy standard is a prototypical
maximum occupancy restriction.
  Edmonds nevertheless argues that its family composi-
tion rule, ECDC 21.30.010, falls within 3607(b)(1), the
FHA exemption for maximum occupancy restrictions,
because the rule caps at five the number of unrelated
persons allowed to occupy a single-family dwelling.  But
Edmonds' family composition rule surely does not answer
the question: -What is the maximum number of occu-
pants permitted to occupy a house?-  So long as they are
related -by genetics, adoption, or marriage,- any number
of people can live in a house.  Ten siblings, their
parents and grandparents, for example, could dwell in a
house in Edmonds' single-family residential zone without
offending Edmonds' family composition rule.
  Family living, not living space per occupant, is what
ECDC 21.30.010 describes.  Defining family primarily
by biological and legal relationships, the provision also
accommodates another group association: five or fewer
unrelated people are allowed to live together as though
they were family.  This accommodation is the peg on
which Edmonds rests its plea for 3607(b)(1) exemption.
Had the City defined a family solely by biological and
legal links, 3607(b)(1) would not have been the ground
on which Edmonds staked its case.  See Tr. of Oral Arg.
11-12, 16.  It is curious reasoning indeed that converts
a family values preserver into a maximum occupancy re-
striction once a town adds to a related persons prescrip-
tion -and also two unrelated persons.-
  Edmonds additionally contends that subjecting single-
family zoning to FHA scrutiny will -overturn Euclidian
zoning- and -destroy the effectiveness and purpose of
single-family zoning.-  Brief for Petitioner 11, 25.  This
contention both ignores the limited scope of the issue
before us and exaggerates the force of the FHA's anti-
discrimination provisions.  We address only whether Ed-
monds' family composition rule qualifies for 3607(b)(1)
exemption.  Moreover, the FHA antidiscrimination provi-
sions, when applicable, require only -reasonable- accom-
modations to afford persons with handicaps -equal op-
portunity to use and enjoy- housing.  3604(f)(1)(A) and
(f)(3)(B).

                       *    *    *
  The parties have presented, and we have decided, only
a threshold question: Edmonds' zoning code provision
describing who may compose a -family- is not a maxi-
mum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA under
3607(b)(1).  It remains for the lower courts to decide
whether Edmonds' actions against Oxford House violate
the FHA's prohibitions against discrimination set out in
3604(f)(1)(A) and (f)(3)(B).  For the reasons stated, the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is
                                              Affirmed.